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RECENT DECISIONS

immediate care, treatment or observation to ascertain his mental
of Bellevue
condition, may be removed to the psychopathic division
25
Hospital 24 for a period not to exceed sixty days.
It was held in Warner v. State 26 that the New York Mental
Hygiene Law did not abolish or curtail the common law power of
summary arrest and restraint of a mentally ill person when necessary
to prevent him from doing some immediate injury to himself or
others.
Judge Washington's concurring opinion in the principal case
recognizes this co-existing procedure in New York and would apply
the common law rule to mitigate the defendant psychiatrist's liability.
He argues that the defendant be permitted to submit as grounds for
further reduction of damages that he acted in good faith by proving
the patient's need for treatment and that the hospitalization was
beneficial. He does not believe that Congress intended to penalize
physicians "for assuming responsibility and taking the action which
membership in their profession and the welfare of the community
require." 27
It would seem that this view propounds a more sound foundation for deciding cases of this kind as compared to the broad measure
of liability imposed by the majority opinion.
It is submitted in cognizance of the increasing mental health
problem, 28 that existent laws in regard to the procedure of hospitalizing the mentally ill 29 could, in many jurisdictions be modified to
acknowledge improved medical principles and social concepts. 30

INSURANCE RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE UNDER MORTGAGEE
CLAUSE OF STANDARD NEW YoR FIRE INSURANCE POLICY. -The

plaintiff held a mortgage on a building which the owner-mortgagor
insured with the defendant company. The policy contained a New
24 N. Y. CITY CHARTER, c. 23, § 583. (The psychopathic ward of the hospital must operate under the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, Section
939.)
25

N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 81.

28297 N. Y. 395, 79 N. E. 2d 459 (1948).
27 Jillson v. Caprio 181 F. 2d 523, 525 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
6
28 Arestad and Mc overn, Hospital Service in the United States, 143 A. M.
A. J., No. 1, p. 25. (In 1949 general patients hospitalized in the United
States totaled 1,224,951 and mental patients comprised 675,096 of this total.)
29FERa
A Sicuarn AGENCy, FSA-A4 (1950). (Eleven states permit
temporary admission only after a court order has been obtained. Seven states
still have no provision for temporary admission to a state hospital for observation or for emergency commitment without a court order. Eight states
still have no provision for voluntary admission to state hospitals. Mentally ill
persons may be kept in jail during the commitment process and while awaiting
hospital admission in thirty-five states.)
30 See Note, 56 YArx L. J. 1178 (1947) (excellent analysis of this problem).
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York standard mortgagee clause. A loss was sustained under the
policy. Failing to agree as to the amount of the damage, the owner
and the defendant proceeded to an appraisal according to the provisions of the policy. The amount tendered to the plaintiff was
refused. The plaintiff stipulated that he had no notice of and did
not participate in the appraisal. It was conceded that no fraud or
bad faith was present. The Appellate Division reversed the trial
court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Held, reversed for the
plaintiff. The language of the mortgagee clause that ".... the interest
of the mortgagee ... shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the mortgagor . . ." can mean but one thing, namely, if any act

of the owner operates to the mortgagee's prejudice, it is not binding
upon him. Since an appraisal, as conducted in this case, might deprive the mortgagee of his full protection, he is not bound thereby.
Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Insurance Co., 124 N. Y. L. J.
1, col. 1 (N. Y., Aug. 30, 1950).
The "standard" or "union" mortgagee clause,' statutory or otherwise, 2 is today the accepted method by which a mortgagee's interest
is protected under a fire insurance policy. The effect of the clause is
with few exceptions s held to create an independent and separate
contract of insurance between the insurer and mortgagee, 4 securing
him from the conditions imposed upon the owner,5 and making him
responsible for his own acts.6 The test which the courts apply is
whether the mortgagee can qualitatively and quantitatively prove his
insurable 7interest, even though he be not named in the contract of
insurance.
Inasmuch as the New York standard fire policy was written to
cover all situations, it imposes many obligations relating to matters
with which a mortgagee could not comply.8 Thus, when the policy
is considered in its entirety, with reference to the language of the
I N. Y. INs. LAW § 168, subd. 6, provides: "Loss or damage, if any, . . .
shall be payable to the mortgagee as interest may appear, and this insurance
. . . shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of tht mortgagor. . ..
2 The standard mortgagee clause became effective in New York in 1886,
and prescribed by New York Laws 1909, c. 33, § 121.
3 Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 81 Ohio St. 1, 89 N. E.
1065 (1909). But cf. Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Porter, 44 Fla. 568, 33 So. 473,
479 (1902).
4 Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 Fed. 165 (8th Cir. 1894); Hastings v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 141 (1879); Overholt v. Reliance Ins.
Co. of Philadelphia, 319 Pa. 340, 179 Atl. 554 (1935).
5 Reeder v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 805 (S. D. Fla. 1933);
Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307 (1894).
6 Goldstein v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 26, 175 N. E. 359
(1931) ; Smith v. Union Ins. Co., 25 R. I. 260, 55 Atl. 715 (1903).
7 Savarese v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. of Le Roy, Ohio, 260 N. Y. 45, 182
N. E. 665 (1932) (although the owner repaired premises, mortgagee entitled
to the proceeds) ; Krause v. Central Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 736
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
8 Heilbrunn v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 140 App. Div. 557 (1st Dep't
1910), aff'd, 202 N. Y. 610, 95 N. E. 823 (1911).

1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

mortgagee clause to the effect that no act or neglect of the insured
shall invalidate the mortgagee's insurance, it is readily seen that the
general agreement in the body of the policy does not and was not intended to apply to the new interest added by the clause. Otherwise,
what meaning could the clause hold? Its language is not ambiguous;
its meaning not obscure; it must be permitted to operate.0 Logically
then, where the two are inconsistent, the special contract relating to
the mortgagee's insurance must take precedence.1 0 Consequently,
even though the appraisal clause 11 in the body of the policy does not
specifically confer upon the mortgagee the right of participation
therein, that provision is not determinative of his rights as it was not
intended to bind the mortgagee.12
It cannot be questioned that an appraisal conducted by the insured and insurer actually may be of benefit to a mortgagee. But
can such an appraisal be deemed to be an "act" or "neglect" contemplated by the mortgagee clause? Obviously, the appraisal itself
may not be detrimental, but if conducted without the mortgagee's
consent or participation, it would have a prejudicial effect upon his
separate interest as a primary party.13 And yet, it is this status, as
such, which the mortgagee clause seeks to safeguard. It would seem,
therefore, that the failure or refusal to acknowledge the mortgagee
as a proper party to the proceeding is, of itself, a violation of his
rights. In short, who are to be parties to an appraisal proceeding
depends upon principles independent of the policy itself,' 4 and those
principles do not permit the insured to deprive the mortgagee of his
right to be a party in the determination of an award to be paid by
the insurance company.
The predecessor of the standard mortgagee clause, the "loss
payable" or "open" mortgage clause, 15 was the object of much con9Reed, Adm'r v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, 81 N. J.L. 523, 80 AtI.
462 (1911) ; Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 320, 38 . E.
307, 311 (1894) ; Hastings v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 141 (1879) ;
Beaver Falls Building & Loan Ass'n v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 290,
157 Atl. 616 (1931).
10 Beaver Falls Building & Loan Ass'n v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., supra
note 9; Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., supra note 9.
11 N. Y. INs. LAw § 168, subd. 6, provides: "In case the insured and this
Company shall fail to agree as to the . . . amount of loss, then, . . each
shall select [an] . . .appraiser .... The appraisers shall first select an...
shall determine the loss .. .!
umpire . . . . An award ... of any two .
12 Queens Ins. Co. v. Peoples' Union Savings Bank, 50 F. 2d 63 (3d Cir.
Omaha
Loan & Trust Co., 41 Neb.
1931); Phenic Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v.
834, 60 N. W. 133 (1894).
13 Lewis v. Guardian Fire & Life Assur. Co., 181 N. Y. 392, 74 N. E. 224
(1905) (mortgagee a necessary party); Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281 (1902) (judgment not binding without
beneficiaries' [mortgagees'] presence); see 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
STATE OF N. Y. 176 (1946); N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 193.
l4Jefferis v. London Assurance Corp., 16 F. Supp. 590 (Del. 1936).
1 The usual clause reads: "Loss, if any, under this policy, payable to the
mortgagee as his interest may appear."
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fusion as concerns assignments 16 and the clause itself. The courts,
however, are practically unanimous in holding that, by reason of this
clause, the mortgagee becomes a mere appointee to receive the insurance proceeds whose right of recovery may be defeated by the insured prior to the loss. 17

On the other hand, the weight of authority

is to the effect that the mortgagee's rights cannot be defeated by an
act of the insured subsequent to a loss.' 8 Accordingly, the majority
of decisions likewise hold that the mortgagee is not bound by an adjustment of loss by the insured and insurer without his knowledge
and assent. 19 There is authority to the contrary 20 where the policy,
in addition, contains provisions authorizing the insured and insurer
to conduct an appraisal, ascertain the loss, etc. Out of these judicially
scarred remains of the loss payable clause, the standard mortgagee
clause was molded to remedy the difficulties heretofore encountered.
Since its inception, the courts have persistently maintained that its
inclusion safeguards the interests of the mortgagee from impairment
by acts of the
owner agreeing to an appraisal without his knowledge
21
and consent.
In view of precedents

22

and upon principle, 23 the holding

16 See Grosvenor v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 17 N. Y. 391, 395
(1858). "There is no just ground for discrimination between this case (loss
payable clause) and that of an assignment . . . . In either case the insurance
is upon the interests of the mortgagor." For a discussion of mortgagees'
rights under a policy assigned to him, see Note, 18 L. R. A. 197 (1909).
'1 Hill v. International Indemnity Co., 116 Kan. 109, 225 Pac. 1056 (1924);
Grosvenor v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 17 N. Y. 391 (1858) ; Keith
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool, 117 Wis. 531, 94 N. W. 295 (1903) ; see Notes,
38 A. L. R. 367 (1925), 18 L. R. A. 199 (1909).
"I Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Stein, 72 Miss. 943, 18 So. 414 (1895);
Browning v. Home Ins Co. of Columbus, Ohio, 71 N. Y. 508 (1877); Hall
v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 64 N. H. 405, 13 Atl. 648 (1888); see
Notes, 38 A. L. R. 383 (1925), 25 L. R. A. 740 (1910).
19 Bergman v. Commercial Union Assur. Corp., 92 Ky. 494, 18 S. W. 122
(1896); Hathaway v. Orient Ins. Co., 134 N. Y. 409, 37 N. E. 40 (1892);
Leslie v. Firemen's Iins. Co. of Newark, 60 Misc. 558, 112 N. Y. Supp. 496
(Sup. Ct. 1908).
20 Collinsville Savings Soc. v. Boston Ins. Co., 77 Conn. 676, 60 A. 647
(1905) ; Chandos v. American Fire Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 184, 54 N. W. 390 (1893).
21 Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Field, 18 Colo. App. 68, 70 Pac.
149 (1902); Gordon v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 77 S. W. 2d 512 (Mo.
1934) ; Laurenzi v. Atlas Ins. Co., 131 Tenn. 644, 176 S. W. 1022 (1915).
Contra: Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 81 Ohio St. 1, 89 N. E.

1065 (1909) (this case relied for authority on Chandos v. American Fire Ins.

Co., supra note 20, a case decided under a simple loss payable clause) ; Dragon
v. Automobile Ins. Co., 265 Mass. 440, 164 N. E. 383 (1929) (although Massachusetts has recognized the separability of a mortgagee's interest, Hardy v.
Lancashire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 210, 44 N. E. 209 (1896), the Dragon case
relied on the Erie Brezing case, smpra, which did not afford a mortgagee such
recognition. The court also assumed a principal and agent relation between
the mortgagee and mortgagor as relates to provisions concerning appraisal, etc.
The theory is similar to that developed by some courts under a loss payable
clause. See note 20 supra.
22 See notes 8, 9 supra.
23 See notes 5, 13 supra.
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reached in the Syracuse Savings Bank case is no more than a logical
extension of the protection so consistently afforded mortgagees by the
New York courts. The decision is supported by a strong preponderance of authority elsewhere 2 4

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-

CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT

FINANCE COMPANY NOT A HOLDER IN DUE

-

CoURsE.-Defendant,

contracting with a seller to purchase a mechanical press, executed
both a conditional sale contract and a promissory note upon plaintifffinance company's blank. The seller assigned the note and contract,
which were separated by a perforated line, to the plaintiff. He then
failed to deliver the press to the defendant. Plaintiff brought suit
on the note upon defendant's refusal to pay. Defendant raised the
personal defense of failure of consideration. Held, judgment for
defendant. When a finance company actively participates in a conditional sale transaction from its inception by counseling and aiding
the future vendor-payee, it cannot be regarded as a holder in due
course of the note given in the transaction and the defense of failure
of consideration may be properly maintained. Commercial Credit
Corporationv. Orange County Machine Works et al., 34 Cal. 2d 766,
214 P. 2d 819 (1950).
The position of the assignee-finance company in consumer conditional sales contracts has long been the source of conflicting
opinions between both financiers I and jurists. 2 These finance companies, who derive their profit from the discounting of notes, have,
in effect, "the actual control and management of the credit and finance
of sellers doing a conditional sale business." 3 Yet, they attempt to
use the shield of a holder in due course 4 in order to gain the advanSee note 21 supra.
1 Adelson, The Mechanics of the Instalment Credit Sales, 2 LAW AND
PROB. 218 (1935).
CoNTEmp.
2
LAW OF SALEs §30 (4th ed. 1947);
OF TE
WHITNEY, OuTL
Schwartz, Rights of the Holder of a Combined Note and Security Contract,
New York Law Journal, Dec. 28, 1936, p. 2400, cols. 1-3; 53 HAv. L. REv.
1200 (1940).
3 Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N. Y.
785 (City Ct. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 568
Supp. 783,
Ct.0T1BLE
1937). INSTRUMENTs LAW § 52; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 91: "A
(Sup.(Nup
24

holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) that it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) that
he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it
had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) that he took it in
good faith and for value; (4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he
had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it."

